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The Impact of Monetary Targeting
in the United States: 1976-1984
ABSTRACT
This paper attempts to assess empirically the impacton output and
inflation of monetary policy in the U.S. during theperiod of Ml targeting
from 1976 to 1984. The impact of policy shockson output and inflation,
and the impact of aggregate demand, aggregate supply andmoney demand shocks
on Ml and the Fed's target path, are examined through the use ofimpulse
response functions. These response functions are based on an
orthogonalization of VAR residuals derived from an estimated structural
model. The VAR specification reflects the finding that Ml andthe Fed's
target for Ml are cointegrated.
The evidence suggests that money supply shocks and shocksto Ml target
have accounted for little of the observed volatility ofoutput or
inflation. However, the induced policyresponse to aggregate demand and
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(408) 429—4082I. Introduction
From the first quarter of 1985 to the fourth quarter of 1986, Mlgrew
at a 14 percent annual rate while nominal GNP growth averaged only
5.1 percent. This divergent behavior has been interpreted bymany as a
breakdown in the relationship between money and nominal income, and it has
led the Federal Reserve to at least temporarily abandon Mltargeting as a
guide to monetary policy. This brings to an end a period during which
monetary policy in the U.S. was generally framed in terms of Ml growth
targets. It would seem, then, that now would be an opportune time to
examine the impact of monetary targeting on both monetary policy and the
economy during the 1976 to 1984 period of Ml targeting. During these
years, the Fed was criticized both for adhering too closely to strict
monetarist policies and for notadheringsufficiently tightly to such
policies. It has even been questioned whether the monetary targets
established by the Fed had any impact on the actual conduct of monetary
policy at all. The frequent deviations from target paths that the Fed
tolerated, as well as the Fed's practice of always using actual Ml as the
base for establishing new target paths no matter how far from the oldpath
actual Ml might be, led many to blame the Fed for excessiveaverage
inflation and inflation volatility.
The purpose of this paper is to assess empirically the impact of the
Fed's monetary policy on real output and inflation during the period of Ml
targeting. After briefly reviewing some aspects of the Fed's targeting
procedures, section II discusses the criticisms the Fed's procedures have
received. This discussion suggests ways in which empirical evidence can be
used to determine whether monetary policy contributed to economic
instability.—2—
The basic approach to determining the impact of monetary policy
involves an examination of impulse response functions and variance
decompositions obtained by using an estimated structural model to
orthogonalize VAR residuals. A general description of this approachis
contained in section III, together with a discussion of the structural
model and the estimation procedure. Section IV presents the empirical
results, while section V contains a brief summary of the paper.
Several interesting conclusions emerge from the analysis. First,
neither shocks to money supply growth nor to the target path seem to
account for much output growth or inflation volatility during this period.
This implies that what contribution monetary policy made to the volatility
of these two variables was not due to autonomous policy shocks. Second,
the induced response of monetary policy to economic shocks does seem to
have contributed to higher inflation.
These conclusions must be viewed as very tentative because of several
limitations from which the empirical analysis suffers. Most important of
these is the shortness of the sample period. This has prevented an
adequate treatment of the possible policy regime shifts that occurred
during the 1976 to 1984 period. This is potentially a serious problem
since several empirical relationships seem to have shifted in response to
changes in Fed policy procedures. For example, Roley and Walsh [19851
report that the response of interest rates to weekly money supply
announcements changed in response to changes in the Feds operating
procedures, and Huizinga and Mishkin [1986] find that the stochastic
process describing real interest rates shifted in October 1979 and October
1982, both dates of monetary policyshifts.1"-3—
Sufficient evidence exists to question the estimation ofa single
model over the entire 1976—1984 period. The scarcity of observations
combined with the plethora of regimes, implies thatone must be cautious
when drawing conclusions from the empirical resultspresented in this
paper. Hopefully, a model estimated over the entire period can still
provide some useful information about the average impact of policyduring
this period.
II. Monetary Targeting
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal ReserveSystem
has publicly announced target growth ranges for monetaryaggregates since
the passage of House Concurrent Resolution 133 in 1975. From thefirst
quarter of 1976 until the passage of the Full Employment and Balanced
Growth Act of l978, the practice of the FOMC was toannounce every
quarter a target growth rate range for each monetary aggregate that would
apply over a four quarter period. Thus, in February 1976, the FOMC seta
target range of 4% -7%for Ml growth to apply to the period from 1975:4
to 1976:4. This target range was calculated from a baseequal to the
actual level of Ml during 1975:4. Three months later, the FOMCannounced a
four quarter target range, again 4+% —7%to apply to the period 1976:1 to
1977:1. The base for this target range was the actual level of Mlduring
1976: 1.
This method of calculating the growth targets for Ml and thebroader
monetary aggregates resulted in quarterly base drift: each quarter, the
base for the new growth ranges shifted to equal the actual level ofmoney
in the previous quarter. The effect of such base drift is tomale
permanent any deviations of actual money from the target path and introduce
a unit root into the money supply process.—4—
Under the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978, the FOMC was required to
establish target growth ranges every February for the calendar year. The
FOMC would establish target ranges to apply from the fourth quarter of the
previous year to the fourth quarter of the current year, calculatedfrom a
base equal to the actual value of the aggregate in the fourth quarter of
the previous year. Thus, in February 1979, the FOMC announced a target
range of 1% -4%growth for Ml starting from the actual value of Ml in
1978:4. This new procedure replaced automatic quarterly base drift with
automatic annual base drift.
The FOMC also reviewed its target ranges at mid-year and occasionally
adjusted either the base or the target growth rate ranges. For example,in
July of both 1983 and 1985 the FOMC responded to rapid Ml growth duringthe
first six months of the year by using second quarter Ml as its new base for
calculating growth paths and by adjusting the growth rateranges.1'
The behavior of the log of Ml during the 1976 to 1984 period is shown
by the solid line in Figure 1. The average annual growth rate fromthe
fourth quarter of 1975 to the fourth quarter of 1984 was 7.4%.The dashed
line in the Figure illustrates a hypothetical path for Ml derived from the
successive midpoints of the target ranges set by the FOMC but maintaining
the base at the actual level of Ml in 1975:4. This "no drift" series for
Ml grew at an average annual rate of 5.5% from 1975:4 to 1984:4. The
cumulative gap between these two lines represents one measure of the effect
on the money supply of allowing base drift to occur. This measure isshown
in Figure 2 as the dashed line. By the fourth quarter of 1984, Ml was
roughly 15% higher than it would have been if it had always grown at the
midpoint of the FOMC's successive growth rate ranges.
The solid line in Figure 2 plots the difference between actual Ml and
the value implied for Ml by the midpoint of the then current target range.-5—
Positive valuesreflect quarters when actual Ml was above the target
midpoint; the series is negative when Mi was below the target midpoint. Ml
exceeded the target midpoint in every quarter except one from 1976:4
through 1981:1. Another string of positive deviations occurred between
1982:2 and 1984:2, including the two largesttarget overshoots of the
period in 1982:4 and 1983:1. Under the FOMC's policy of automatic base
drift, each quarter's deviation prior to 1979:1 permanently affected the
subsequent Ml path. After 1979:1, only fourth quarter deviationswere
impounded automatically into the target path.
The FOMC has frequently been criticized for allowing Ml to deviate
from the midpoint growth rate implied by the targetranges ——particularly
when Ml ended a target period outside theranges altogether -andfor then
allowing target deviations to become permanent by using actual Ml as the
base for subsequent target paths.1 Automatic base driftimplies that the
money stock will follow a random walk process, and such a process would
seem to be inconsistent with a policy of price stabilization. It has also
been claimed that, since base drift makes permanentany short-run
deviations from target, it hinders the achievement of both stablemoney
growth and stable prices over longer periods. Broaddus and Goodfriend
[19841 discuss three major objections to base drift. First, it reducesthe
public's confidence in the Fed's commitment to maintaining stable,steady
expansion of the money supply over the long—run. Second, by automatically
"forgiving" any target misses, base drift greatly reduces the incentives
for the Fed to hit its targets. Missing a target inone year imposes no
penalty on the Fed in subsequent years since each year automatically starts
on target. Third, temporary disturbances that cause money to deviate from
target are allowed to permanently affect the money stock and, therefore,-6-
the price level. This leads to increased uncertainty about the future
price level and reduces one of the advantages of monetarytargeting.'
Goodfriend [19861 has recently argued that the non—trend stationarity
of both the money supply and the price level arises from the Federal
Reserve's attempts to smooth nominal interestrates.' The manner in
which an interest rate smoothing objective by the monetary authority leads
to a non—trend stationary price level can be illustrated by considering the
impact of a random price level shock that leaves the real rateof interest
unchanged.Z' Any attempt to move the price level back to its initial level
will generate non—zero expected inflation, thereby leading to nominal
interest rate movements. The monetary authority can prevent nominal rates
from moving by keeping the expected rate of inflation equal to zero.
Hence, in this example, smoothing nominal interest rates is similar to
smoothing expected inflation. In such an environment, the monetary
authority can keep expected inflation always equal to zero as long as all
price level movements are expected to be permanent. Thus, a disturbance
that would otherwise result in a temporary price fluctuation will end up
having a permanent effect on the price level because of the induced effect
of monetary policy. In contrast, Goodfriend shows that, with price level
smoothing objectives alone, the optimal price level is trend stationary.













The ex—ante real rate of interest is assumed to be equal to a constant,r,
so the nominal rate Rt is given in equation (1) as r plus the expected rate
of inflation. Equation (2) gives the demand for real money balances as a
function of the nominal interest rate and a stochastic component,c, whose
generating process is specified by equation (3).at is assumed to be a
white noise disturbance term. For 0 <e<1, follows a stationary
stochastic process with finite unconditional variance a/(1 —82);for 8 =
1,cx follows a random walk. A simple policy rule for the nominal money
supply that assumes m can contemporaneously respond to the stochastic
component of money demand is given by equation (4).e is a random walk
control error whereCt in (5) is a white noise disturbance assumed to be
uncorrelated with at. The parameter62 is taken to be a choice variable of
the monetary authority (as is 6i) that allows the policymaker to affect the
degree of persistence the control error has on the level of the nominal
money supply.
If bubble solutions are ruled out, it is straightforward to show that
the equilibrium price level is given by
(6i —1) 62 6) Pt =1+8(1_el)
+(l_d2)e+
1+8(et -eti)-8-
and the nominal Interest rate is equal to
(6i_1)(e_1) 62 (7)
Rt= l+8(lO) 1+B (et_eti)+r.
Equations (6) and (7) show the potential conflict that exists between
interest rate smoothing and price level statlonarity. It Is clear that
money demand disturbances should always be completely accomodated (61 =1)
since that reduces the one step ahead forecast error variances of both Pt
and Rt. However, interest rate smoothing also requires that 62 =0,while
price level stationarity requires that 62 =1.
A choice of 62 =0ImplIes that is non—trend stationary, so one
could characterize the nonstationarity of p as caused by the
nonstationarity of m. However, nonstationarity of in is neither necessary
nor sufficient to generate price level nonstationarity. For example, If
o =1but =0,p will be nonstatlonary whether or not in Is.
An alternative perspective that will prove useful in the empirical
analysis is to note that if the unit root in p is induced by the unit root








1 +6i8(1_O) 862 (8) = a 1 + 8(1—8)t1+8 t-9-
Equation (8) shows that e1 is both necessary and sufficient for real
money balances to be stationary. This result holds regardless of the
values taken by the policy parameters and 62.
If e <1and 62 =0,both p and m are nonstationary while m -pwill
be cointegrated (Engle and Granger [l986]).V This isa testable
hypothesis and will be examined in Section II. Evidence that cointegration
can be rejected would indicate that the real demand formoney is subject to
permanent shocks (e =1).In this case, a policy of steady growth in the
money supply would still generate a random walk component to the price
level as prices adjust to keep the real supply ofmoney equal to real
demand in the face of permanent shifts in demand. Nonstationarity ofp
would arise in this case even if the monetary authority placedno weight on
interest rate smoothing as an objective of policy, and, instead, followeda
constant growth rate rule for the money supply.
While the Fed's toleration of frequent target misses and itsprocedure of
introducing a unit root into the money stock would certainly seem to create at
least a priori grounds for attributing inflation volatility,price level
uncertainty and the non—trend stationarity of the price level to Federal Reserve
policy, a non—trend stationary money stock can also arise even when the central
bank's only concern is price stability if realmoney demand is nonstationary.
Minimizing price forecast error variance requires that61 =62
=1.In this
case, p is stationary, but the nominal money supply, and real money balances
will be nonstationary if e =1.The money stock will itself follow a difference
stationary process. However, the unit root in money, rather thaninducing a
unit root in prices, would in this case, prevent prices fromhaving a random
walk component.12' Evidence that Fed•policy has introduceda unit root into the- 10-
moneysupply rocss is not, therefore, sufficient to support the viewthat base
drift has contributed to inflation volatility arid price level uncertainty.
The joint behavior of money, the Fed's target for Ml, and major macro
variables can provide evidence on the impact of monetary policy during the
targeting period. If the Fed has introduced a unit root into moneyin an
attempt to limit the price adjustment required by persistent velocityand income
shocks, money and prices will not be cointegrated. In addition, both velocity
and output shocks should lead to adjustments in the target path and the actual
money stock only to the extent that such shocks are persistent.Thus, evidence
that temporary velocity or output shocks produce permanent movements in the
target path would provide evidence that the FOMC's targeting practiceshave
contributed to price instability.
Because a monetary policy concerned with price stability should offset
money supply control errors (&2 =1),a finding that money supply shocks lead to
persistent money supply and price movements would also indicate that Fed policy
has contributed to price instability. Further evidence that the FOMC has,
through its policy actions, contributed to inflation uncertainty would be a
finding that either innovations to the, target path or to the money supply itself
account for a significant fraction of inflation volatility.
In assessing the impact of monetary policy, an important distinction must
be made between the effects of policy shocks and the effects of induced policy
responses. For example, a monetary authority might maintain perfectcontrol
over the money supply and eliminate all unpredicted money supply movements
(i.e., no money shocks are allowed to occur), but still contribute to output and
inflation volatility through its systematic reaction to economic disturbances.
The opposite extreme would be a policy that allows no money supply movements in
response to economic events but which, because of poor control techniques,- 11-
permitsfrequent random shocks to the money supply. In judging an historical
episode, it is useful to know whether the major effects of monetary policy arose
through the systematic reaction of the monetary authorities to movements in
income, inflation and interest rates or through unpredicted shifts in the
monetary targets or the money supply itself.
This discussion suggests that a Vector Autoregression (VAR) incorporating
the FOMC's monetary target, the actual money supply, and the aggregate price
level, plus other macro variables, can shed light on the validity of the
criticisms of FOMC procedures. Impulse response functions derived from an
estimated VAR system can indicate whether the FOMC has allowed temporary output
shocks or money demand shocks to produce persistent movements in money and
prices. The contribution of money shocks and policy target shocks to inflation
volatility can be assessed by examining the variance decomposition of
inflation forecast errors.
To provide really useful information, however, it is necessary to
identify orthogonalized money supply shocks, policy target shocks, etc.
from the VAR residuals. The method by which a structural interpretation
for the orthogonalized innovations is achieved is discussed in the next
section, together with a description of the variables included in the VAR
system and a discussion of the implications of cointegration for the
specification of the variables in the VAR.
III. Empirical Specification
A.Cointegration and Stationarity
In order to investigate the impact of the FOMC's target paths, the
approach to structural estimation used recently by Blanchard and Watson
[1985J, Bernanke [19851, Sims [19861, and Blanchard [19861 is adopted.- 12-
Thisapproach combines a Vector Autoregression with restrictions imposed by
a structural model in order to avoid the assumption, implicit in the
standard calculations of variance decompositions and impulse response
functions, that the variables in the system are related by a recursive
structure.
Quarterly, seasonally adjusted data on five variables are incorporated
in the empirical work: the natural log of real GNP (Y), the log of the GNP
Price Deflator (P), the three—month Treasury bill rate (R), log Ml (M), and
the log of a measure of the Feds target for Ml (T). Tt is defined as the
midpoint of the target range for log Mlt+i as calculated from information
known at time t. T is thus a forward looking measure of the target path,
and it is constructed by applying the midpoint of the target range for t+1
in effect during t to the target base then in effect. For example, suppose
the FOMC in February of year t announces a target range for Ml of 4% -7%
from a base of actual Ml in the fourth quarter of year t-1. Then, in July,
suppose they revise the range to 3% —6%for the rest of the year, but do
not revise the base. Then, in the second quarter of year t, T would equal
log Ml for the fourth quarter of year t—1 plus .04125 (the midpoint of 4%—
7% growth for nine months expressed at a quarterly rate). For the third
quarter, T would equal log Ml for the fourth quarter of year t—1 plus .0275
(six months growth at the midpoint of 4% -7%plus .0225 (six months growth
at the midpoint of the new 3% —6%range). Refering to Figure 2 the solid
line is equal to Mt -
Anumber of recent empirical studies have suggested that most
macroeconomic variables are better represented as difference stationary,
and not trend stationary, processes.U' It has become common, therefore,
to specify VAR's in first difference form. However, Engle and Grangër- 13-
[1986]point out that such a specification is incorrect if the system is
cointegrated. A vector x is said to be cointegrated of order (1,1) if all
elements of x are stationary in their first difference and there exitsa
nonzero vectorsuch that &x is stationary)1" Before specifying the
form of the VAR, it is necessary to consider the possibility thatsuch a
cointegrating vectorexists.
Three pairwise comparisons involving likely candidates for
cointegration were examined -realmoney balances (M—P), the real value of
the target variable (T—P), and the difference between thetarget and the
current money stock (T—M). For each pair, the null hypothesis that the two
variables are not cointegrated is tested.
The testing procedure can be illustrated with respect to M and P.If
real money balances are stationary, then M and P are cointegrated with
known cointegrating vector =(1,—i).A test of the null of no
cointegration can be obtained by regressing the change in M-P on a constant
and the lagged level of M—P. The test statistic is just the F—statistic
for the joint significance of the two estimated coefficients. Underthe
null hypothesis of no cointegration, this test statistic does not havean F
distribution, but Dickey and Fuller [1981] provide significance levels
based on Monte Carlo results. A high value of the test statistic indicates
rejection of no cointegration.
The Dickey—Fuller test statistics for M—P, T-P, and T-M arereported
in part I of Table 1. At a 5% significance level, we cannotreject the
null hypothesis that M—P and 1—P are not cointegrated. This result casts
doubt on the argument that the Fed generates non—trend stationarity of P
and M while M—P is stationary. In contrast, the hypothesis that T-M isnot
cointegrated can be rejected. This reflects the fact that next quarter's- 14-
targetfor Ml
cart
never stray too far from the current level of Ml. Note
that this is consistent with a policy that keeps the target pathfixed and
returns M to the target path whenever it deviates from it, and with a
policy that employs base drift so that the target is adjustedto ensure
that it never gets too far from the actual money supply. The latter
interpretation would seem to more closely describe Fed behavior.
As a check on these results, cointegration was tested under the
additional hypothesis that the cointegration vector is unknown. That is,
the null hypothesis is that, for example, M—aP is not cointegrated, with a
unknown.Engle and Granger [19861 discuss several alternative testsbased
on the regression of M on P. This regression is called the cointegrating
regression by Engle and Granger. Part II.A of Table 1 shows thatfor each
of the three cointegrating regressions, the estimated aisessentially
equal to
Three of Engle and Granger's test statistics are reported. The first,
reported in part II.A, is just the Durbin—Watson statistic from the
cointegrating regression. Under the null of no cointegration, the
residuals will be nonstationary and the O—W will approach zero. Thus, a
large O—W implies rejection of no cointegration. Based on Monte Carlo
results, Engle and Granger report a 5% critical value for the D—W of 0.386.
Only for T.-M can the null be rejected. The second test regresses the
change in the residuals from the cointegrating regression on their lagged
level, and the test statistic is the t—statistic for the coefficient on the
lagged residual term. This is reported in the row headed in part II.B
of Table 1. The null can again be rejected only for T—M. Finally, the row
headed reports the t-stattstic on the lagged residual from the
cointegrating regression in a regression with the change in the residual as— 15—
thedependent variable and that includes, in addition to the lagged level,
four lagged changes in the residual. This statistic provides theonly
conflicting results as it suggests the null cannot be rejected for any of
the three cases.
The evidence clearly indicates that real money balances and the real
value of the target variable are nonstationary. The pairs (M, P) and(T,P)
are not cointegrated. However, three of the four tests indicate that I and
M are cointegrated, and, for the subsequent analysis, this will be assumed
to be the case..
It can be argued that the apparent non-trend stationarity of real
money balances results from the positive income elasticity of the demand
for real balances. The presence of a unit root in real income then induces
nonstationarity in real money balances)-" This suggests that M—P and V
should be cointegrated with cointegrating vector (1 —a) wherea is the
income elasticity of real money demand. The estimate ofa obtained from
the cointegrating regression of M-P on Y, together with three test
statistics for the null hypothesis of no cointegration are given in
Table 2. The evidence appears consistent with the null of no
cointegration.1"
These results have interesting implications for interpreting the
implications for the prive level process of a policy that makes M follow a
trend stationary process. The evidence that neither realmoney balances
nor real balances adjusted for income are stationary suggests the demand
for money is nonstationary. Therefore, the price level will be non-trend
stationary even if the nominal money supply were to follow a constant
growth rate path)- 16-
Aspreviously mentioned, it has become common to enter variables in
VAR systems in first differenced form in order to ensure stationarity. The
evidence that T and M are cointegrated suggests specifying the VAR in terms
of the first differences of the logs of output, the price level, the
interest rate, and the money supply and the level of the target minus the
money supply. Table 1 has provided evidence that T—Mis stationary. Tests
were also conducted for the presence of a unit root in the first
differences of Y, P, R, andM.' The null hypothesis of a unit root can
be rejected at the 5% level for -'l'-i Rt_Rt ,andMt_Mt_i. However,
this hypothesis is not rejected for the first difference of the price
level. This evidence of a possible second unit root in the price level (a
unit root in the rate of inflation) may explain the failure to reject the
absence of cointegration for M and P since the tests were based on the
assumption that Mt_Mt_i and P-i were stationary. Economic theory,
however, would not imply a unit root in inflation if the growth rates of
money and output are stationary. Regressing the inflationrate on a
constant, a time trend and four lagged values of the inflation rate yielded
a coefficient on the time trend with a marginal significance level of.062.
Since neither money growth nor output growth have trends, this result is
also hard to reconcile with standard aggregatemodels)" It is worth
noting, however, that all these tests may have little power, given the
shortness of the sample period.
B. VAR Specification
On the basis of the tests for cointegration and stationarity reported
in Section III.A, two alternative specification for the VAR system are
suggested. One specification would include the first differences of Y, R,- 17-
Mand the rate of inflation and the level of I-M.The second would
include' the first differences of Y, R, M and P, the level ofT-M, and a
time trend. Only the empirical results obtainedusing this second
specification will be presented, since it provides a more naturalparallel
treatment of all the variables. However, the VAR estimation andthe
structural model estimation (to be discussed below)were repeated using the
second difference of p and excluding a time trend. The resultsobtained
from this specification are presented in the appendix.IV
Define Z' =
AMt, Tt_Mt) wheredenotes the first
difference. It will be assumed that these five variablesare linked by a
set of structural equations of the form
AZt =B(L)Zt1+ut (9)
where A is an invertable 5 x 5 matrix, and B(L) isa 5 x 5 matrix of
polynomials in the lag operator L. The vector is a vector of
independently distributed, serially uncorrelated "structuraP disturbance
terms with diagonal covariance matrix In the present context, the
equations in (9) can be thought of as an aggregate demand equation,an
aggregate supply equation, a money demand equation, a money supply
equation, and a target setting equation.
Premultiplying both sides of (9) by A1 yields
Zt =D(L)Zti+Vt (10)
where 0(L) =AB(L)and v =A4ut.Equation (10) is in the standard form
of a VAR, and it canbe estimated by OLS to obtain consistentestimates. of- 18-
theVAR residual v. In the present application, the estimation period
for the VAR was 1977:1 -1984:4. A lag length of four was used,and a
constant and time trend were included in each regressionequation.'1 In
addition, a dummy variable equal to one from 1979:4 to1982:3 and zero
otherwise was included in a crude attempt to represent the effectsof the
period during which the Fed employed a nonborrowed reserve operating
procedure.
The objective, however, is to obtain estimates of the response of
each variable in Z to innovations in the structural disturbances u.The
VAR residuals are equal to a linear combination of the structural
disturbances given by Av =u.
The now standard procedure for generating
impulse response functions and variance decompositionsinvolves
orthogonalizirig the VAR residuals using the Choleski decompositionof the
sample covariance matrix M =(1/T)vv'.If S is a lower triangular matrix
such that SS' =M,the transformed orthogonalized residuals with unit
variance are given by S4v. If Q is the unique positive diagonal matrix
such that QQ' =) (i.e.,the diagonal elements of Q are just the standard
errors of the ui's), then the structural model implies that theVAR
residuals should be orthogonalized and scaled by premultiplying v byQ1A.
Q1A will generally not be lower triangular unless the structural
relationships represented by the matrix A imply a recursive structure, so
variance decompositions and impulse response functions derived from a
Choleski decomposition will not give the effects of the structural shocks
(the ui's) on the variables of thesystem.-"
In order to use a decomposition that allows for a structural
interpretation, it is necessary to estimate the unknown elements of A and
• From (9) and (10), vv' =Auu' A1. Equating population moments
with sample moments,- 19-
M1=AA''. (11)
SinceM contains 5*6/2 =15bits of sample information, equation (11) gives
15 nonlinear simultaneous equations in the unknown elements of A and
Thus, if there are 15 or fewer elements to estimate in A and ,the
information in (11) can potentially be used to obtain estimates of the
structural parameters of the model. Since there are 5 variances in
there must be 10 or fewer nonzero elements of A.
Given a specification of the zeros in A, the actual estimation
procedure employed is that of Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).' Let
0bethe 15 x 1 vector consisting of the stacked elements of M on and below
the diagonal. Let e(o) be the corresponding vector of elements of
A 'A'' 4, where 8 denotes the k x 1 vector of unknown parameters in A
and Parameter estimates are obtained by minimizing the quadratic form
(e—e(o)) 'W(o—e())
with respect to the elements of o, where the weighting matrix W is given by
w=
Inthis notation, the typical element of e would be of the form
(l/T)zv1tv.t, while the corresponding element of is The
asymtotic covariance matrix of the parameter estimates is estimated by
{E(o-)/aoJ 'W[a(o-e)/ao]}- 20-
Underfairly general assumptions, the GMM estimators are consistent and
asymtotically efficient.
In order to implement this procedure it is necessary to impose a
priori restrictions on the elements of A and The covariance matrix
is taken to be diagonal. The elements of A are chosen to represent a
fairly standard, ad—hoc aggregate model. Let v' =(y,p, r, m t-m) be the
residuals from the VAR system. By definition, Avt =Ut.
These five
equations, reflecting the contemporaneous relationships in the structural
relationships, are assumed to take the following form:
-Q(r

















- = u5. (16)
Equation (12) gives aggregate demand as a function of the expected
real rate of interest. In the definition of the expected real interest
rate, P'+ denotes the effect of the current realization of v on
expectations of This can be calculated using the coefficients from
the estimated VAR.'. The structural disturbance u1. has the
interpretation of an aggregate demand shock. Equation (13) is a Phillips
Curve type relationship, with u2. equalling an aggregate supplyshock.'- 21-
Equation(14) is a simple inverted money demand equation. Suppose the




lagged terms and the disturbance term. The resulting relationship among
the VAR residuals takes the forma3y +a4r-(m—p) =t.Normalizing on the




t/a4.u3 is interpreted as a money demand shock.
Equations (15) and (16) capture the actions of the Federal Reserve in
setting monetary policy. Equation (15) represents a money supply
relationship that assumes the Fed allows nominal money supply growth to
respond to income growth, nominal interest rate changes and inflation with
u4 equal to a money supply shock. The money target set for period t-i-1 is
assumed to depend on current money growth, income growth, and inflation.
u5 has the interpretation of a shock to next quarter's money target.
It may appear that the model structure is recursive with respect to
the target variable, since t only occurs in equation (16). However, this
is not the case. Variations in t, the target for can, in principle,
influence the expected rate of inflation. Through the real rate channel in
equation (12), t can contemporaneously affect rt and mt.
IV. Empirical Results
It is useful to recall the questions motivating this study before the
empirical results are examined. A major criticism of targeting as
practiced by the FOMC is that monetary volatility contributed to output and
price instability, and that allowing base drift let temporary control
errors have permanent effects on prices. Evidence relevant for an
evaluation of this critique would be provided by estimates of the impact of
innovations in the target path and in the money supply on the subsequent- 22-
pathof money and prices, by estimates of the contribution of target
uncertainty and money uncertainty to the volatility of output and prices,
and by evidence on the induced policy response to aggregate demand shocks,
money demand shocks and aggregate supply disturbances.
The first step in estimating the impact of target and money
disturbances involves the estimation of the structural model outlined in
the previous section using the residual covariance matrix obtained from the
unrestricted VAR estimates. The residual covariance and correlations are
reported in Table 3. The significant cross correlations indicate that
impulse response functions and variance decompositions derived from a
standard Choleski decomposition of the residual covariance matrix are
likely to be sensitive to the chosen ordering. In order to employ an
orthogonalization that allows a structural interpretation, equations (12) —
(16)were estimated.
The GMM estimates obtained for the parameter of the structural model
are presented in Table 4. In general, the estimates are relatively
imprecise as judged from their asymptotic standard errors. However,
several are statistically significant (9 of 15) and the signs of the
estimates accord with a priori expectations.
The estimated contemporaneous effect of the expected real interest
rate on output is essentially equal to zero. This implies that real output
is predetermined with respect to the other contemporaneous variables of the
system. In particular, there will be no contemporaneous effect of money or
target shocks on output via the channel of expected future inflation.
A zero value for has two important implications for the current
analysis. First, it implies that the model has a block recursive structure
in which y is exogenous with respect top, r, m, and t—m, while p is— 23—
exogenouswith respect to r, m, and t—m. In turn, this implies that the
variance decompositions and impulse response functions derived by using the
structural estimates to orthogonalize the VAR residuals will show effects
of y and p shocks equivalent to those obtained using a standard Choleski
decomposition with y and p placed first and second in the ordering.
However, the Choleski decomposition assumes a recursive structure among all
the variables of the system, while the exogeneity of y in the present model
is estimated from the data. Table 4 gives the estimated matrix used to
orthogonalize the VAR residuals and it shows that r and m are
simultaneously related.
Second, c =0implies that the expectations channel by which the
future money target might affect current output is nonoperative. Changes
in next quarter's Ml target may influence expected inflation and real
interest rates, but there is no contemporaneous output effect.
The estimated equation for the money supply shows a strong response to
nominal interest rate movements (ci5 =3.01).This seems consistent with
the general perception that, even while expressing its goals in terms of
monetary targets, the Fed has attempted to smooth interest rate
movements.W Money supply growth alsoappears to show little response to
real output changes, but an increase in inflation tends to reduce it. The
target variable seems to depend mainly on actual money and inflation. The
negative coefficient on m might indicate some attempt by the FOMC to
offset monetary control errors by adjusting down the target for money
relative to m if current money growth has been high.
Of particular interest are the estimated variances of the structural
disturbance terms, since these disturbances each have an intuitive
interpretation.- 24-
Aggregatedmand
shocks are estimated to have the largest variance,
althoug'h the asymptotic standard error is huge (886.0).The variance of
aggregate supply shocks is only one eighth that of aggregatedemand shocks,
while the other variances are even smaller. Of particular interest is the
fact that money supply shocks have a relatively small variance even though
Table 3 shows that the variance of the one—step ahead forecast error for
money in the VAR is second only to that for output.This implies that most
of the one-step ahead forecast error in Ml growth is due, not to money
supply shocks, but to the endogenous response of money to output,
inflation, and interest rates.
The finding of a small variance for money demand shock would seem to
contrast with the usual Fed emphasis on the importance of such
disturbances. However, a32 is defined in terms of an equation normalized
on the interest rate (equation .(14)). The implied varianceof the money
demand function written with real money balances as the dependent variable
is This approaches the variance of aggregate demand shocks in
magnitude and is more consistent with the standard Fed view.
The impact of monetary policy and monetary targeting on output and
inflation will be studied in two steps. First, the effect of independent
money supply shocks and disturbances to the target pathwill be examined.
Second, the effect of the endogenous policy response to macro disturbances
will be estimated. This distinction between policy disturbances and
induced policy actions is important in assessing monetary policy.
A.Money Supply and Target Shocks
Using the estimated structural parameters, together with the VAR
system, it is possible to examine the role played by money supply .shocks- 25-
andshocks to th? target path in the determination ofoutput growth and
changes in the rate of inflation. Information on the importance of these
disturbances can be gained from an examination of the variance
decompositions implied by the model. The variance decompositions show the
fraction of the forecast error variance of a variable attributableto each
of the innovations in the system at various forecast horizons.As the
forecast horizon approaches infinity, these equal theproportion of the
unconditional variance of the variable due to each innovationsource. The
variance decompositions are presented in Table 5.
The variance decompositions indicate that independentmoney supply and
target disturbances account for little of the forecast error variance of
either output or inflation. These two disturbances explain less than15
percent of the output growth forecast error variance at 24 quarters, and
little more than 1 percent at a forecast horizon of 2quarters.
Interestingly, shocks to the target for future money seem more important
than money supply shocks. Money supply and target shocks accountfor even
less of the forecast error variance of inflation changes.Again, however,
target shocks accounts for more of the inflation forecast error than do
money supply shocks.
The variance decompositions for money and the targetproduce some
interesting results. The Fed usually attributes deviation ofmoney from
target to the presence of money demand shocks, and Table 5 shows thatmoney
demand disturbances are important in explaining the variance ofmoney
forecast errors. In fact, almost 40 percent of theone-step ahead forecast
error in money growth is attributed to money demand disturbances. But
aggregate demand disturbances are even more important.The structural
model attributes little of the target variance tomoney supply shocks and- 26-
muchmore to aggegate demand, aggregate supply, money demand, and target
disturbances.
The impulse response functions showing the effects of money supply and
target shocks are shown in Figure 3. Panels 3a and 3b illustrate the
impact on the levels of Y, P, M and T of a one—standard deviation
realization of u4. In 3a, a positive money supply shock tends to produce
an output expansion with a three quarter lag. This is very quickly
reversed, however, and output appears to cycle around the no—shock path.
In contrast, the price level begins to rise after 8 quarters. The positive
slope of the price level path after 2 years indicates that money supply
shocks have permanent effects on the rate of inflation.
Panel 3b shows why a money supply shock tends to raise the rate of
inflation. Money supply shocks during the period of monetary targeting
were not subsequently reversed. As 3b shows, there is some initial offset
to the shock so that the level of M moves back towards its no—shock value.
However, after four quarters, this offset ends, and the rate of growth of M
seems to be left permanently higher." The target path appears to follow
the upward trend in money, although it exhibits large cycles around an
upward trend.
Panel 3c shows that target shocks, like money supply shocks, initially
generate a positive output response, followed by cycles in the level of
output around the no-shock level.In contrast, the price level is above
the no—shock path for five quarters following the shock to the target
variable. Then, however, the price level appears to drift downward,
suggesting a permanently lower rate of inflation. As shown by panel 3d,
the lower rate of inflation is paralleled by a reduction in the rate of
growth of the money supply. Somewhat paradoxically then, during this- 27-
periodof monetary targeting, upward shocks to the level of thetarget path
ultimately were followed by a reduced rate of growth of themoney supply
and a fall in the rate of inflation.
Two general Conclusions seem to emerge from this empiricalanalysis.
First, innovations to the target path and to money growth explain little of
the forecast error variance of output and prices. Second, positivemoney
supply shocks do seem to generate higher rates of inflation. In contrast,
positive target shocks lead to a somewhat lower subsequent rate of
inflation.
These conclusions, however, do not shed light on the criticism that
the Fed's induced response to economic disturbances has contributed to
output and inflation volatility. Aggregate demand shocks, for example,may
account for a large fraction of inflation forecast error varianceprecisely
because of the Fed's attempt to dampen interest rate movements. It is
necessary, therefore, to examine the induced effects of disturbances on
money supply growth and the target growth rate.
B. Endogenous Policy Responses
In order to determine whether output, inflation, andmoney demand
disturbances have induced monetary policy responses that have contributed
to price instability, impulse response functions from the structural model
are presented in Figures 4 —6.
The estimated effect of an aggregate demand shock is shown inFigures
4a and 4b. An aggregate demand shock has a strong positiveimpact on
output growth that is subsequently only partially reversed. The
contemporaneous response of money growth is positive, but after one quarter
money growth turns negative, reflecting perhaps a delayed attempt at- 28-
stabilizationPoilcY. There appearsto be no systematic long—run effect on
either the growth rate of money or the level of M. The rate of inflation
is also not permanently affected, but the price level is left higher by the
aggregate demand shock.
The impact of an aggregate supply (inflation) shock, shown in Figure
5, provides evidence that the induced monetary policy response contributed
to the inflationary impact of such shocks. Panel 5a shows that an
aggregate supply shock causes the price level to grow at a roughlyconstant
rate relative to the no-shock path. This permanent effect on the rate of
inflation is mirrored by a permanent positive effect on the rate of money
growth. Panel 5b shows that the money supply initially fallsin response
to the supply shock, but after 4 quarters, M has returned to its no—shock
level and then exhibits a sustained increase in its rate of growth. The
target reacts in a similar fashion, although the initial fall Inthe level
of the path is larger than the fall in the actual money supply.
Figure 6 shows that money demand shocks are initially accommodated by
a rise in the money supply. This is only partially offset; M and I are
left permanently higher. Panel 6a shows that output reacts positively to a
money demand shock. This may reflect the persistent positive money supply
response to a temporary money demand disturbance. Initially,the money
demand shock is offset by accommodative monetary policy. However, because
the expansion in M is not subsequently reversed, there is a net
expansionary effect on output. In addition, the price level rises and
remains at a level slightly above the no shock path.
In the case of inflation shocks and money demand shocks, the evidence
that emerges from these impulse response functions suggests that the
induced response of the money supply contributed importantly to subsequent- 29-
priceand output movements. Only in the case of aggregate demand shocks
was there no long—run response of the money supply. In all cases, the
target path tends to follow the path of actual money. This reflects the
fact the two variables are assumed to be cointegrated.
V.Summary and Conclusions
This paper represents a first step towards an evaluation of the
conduct of monetary policy during the decade of monetary targeting. The
empirical analysis found that neither money supply nor monetary target
shocks seemed to account for much of the forecast error variances of output
growth and inflation. The induced response of money growth to aggregate
demand shocks also did not appear to contribute to higher inflation but the
response to aggregate supply shocks did. The response of monetary policy
to money demand shocks led to a permanently higher price level with no
long-run effect on the rate of inflation.
While the results suggest that the Fed's response to economic
disturbances contributed to inflation, this does not imply that steady
money growth during this period would have induced stationary behavior in
the price level. The failure to reject the null hypothesis that Ml and
prices are not cointegrated indicates that the real demand for money is
nonstationary. Thus, a nonreactive monetary policy that keeps Ml growing
at a constant rate would also have produced nonstationary behavior in the
price level.
It may be prudent to conclude by reviewing the limitations of the
analysis that force any results to be viewed as preliminary in nature. The
chief limitations arise from the shortness of the sample period together
with the changes in Federal Reserve operating procedures which occurred in- 30-
October1979 and October 1982. Even without such policy shifts, the
empirical analysis relies on identifying restrictions imposed on the
contemporaneous relations between the one-step—ahead forecast errors of the
variables in the VAR system. These exclusion restrictions may be
questioned, and the results might change if an alternative structure is
imposed.
Despite the fact that there were changes in operating procedures, the
-periodunder study was one in which Ml targeting did provide a conceptual
framework that guided monetary policy. For this reason, it is hoped that
the empirical results obtained here may provide some indication of the
impact of monetary policy between 1976 and 1984.- 31-
Footnotes
1. Walsh [1987a1 discusses a potential problem with F1uizinga and
Mishkin's method of identifying real rate shifts.
2.This Act is better know as the Humphrey—Hawkins Act.
3.Each year, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis publishes in its
Review a useful analysis of the FOMC deliberations on setting targets
during the previous year.
4. In one of the earliest attacks on base drift, Poole [19761 suggested,
as an alternative procedure, that the midpoint of the previous year's
target range, and not actual MI, be used as the new base. This
recommendation was also proposed in the 1985 Economic Report of the
President. In Figure 1, theaashed line is derived by applying this
procedure. Deviations from target would no longer have permanent
effects on the path of the money stock if this recommendation were
adopted.
5.The Shadow Open Market Coninittee (19851 has recommended the
elimination of base drift. See also M. Friedman [1982, 19851 and
McCallum [19841.
6. For evidence that most macroeconomic time series are difference
stationary, and not trend stationary, see Nelson and Plosser [1982].
7.The intuition behind this example differs somewhat from that developed
by Goodfriend.
8. The main difference between this model and Goodfriend's are the
simplier form of the policy rule used here, the assumption that is
contemporaneously observed, and the assumption about the stochastic
properties of Barro [19871 uses a similar model to analyze
interest rate smoothing policies.— 32-
9.Two variables x and y are said to be cointegrated of order (1,1) if
the first difference of both are stationary and there exists a nonzero
such that x +ayis stationary. Cointegration is discussed in
Section II.A below.
10.This point Is developed more fully in Walsh [19861, and the optimal
degree of base drift is derived as a function of the stochastic
properties of income and velocity.
11. For example, see Gould, Miller, Nelson and Upton [19781, Nelson and
Plosser [1982], Kim [19851, and Campbell and Mankiw [1986].
12.A useful sunuuary of the theory of cointegration can be found in
Campbell and Shiller [19861.
13. Engle and Grarger also suggest estimatingfrom the error—correction
regression of AM or P on lagged changes in M and P and lagged levels
of M and P. The estimated values forare obtained as the ratio of
the coefficient on lagged M to that on lagged P (when AM 15 the
dependent variable).





M -aP: AP 2.38
I -P: AT 1.025
I —ciP: AP 2.38
I -ciM: AT 1.011
T -aM: AM 0.998- 33—
14. Iri terms of of the model f Section I, income would be one of the
factors giving rise to a nonstationary process for
15.Since the income elasticity of real money demand is often assumed to
equal one, the null hypothesis of no cointegration among M, P. and V
with known cointegration vector (1 —1 —1) was also tested and the null
could not be rejected. This agrees with ealier studies that have
found velocity to be non—trend stationary. See the references cited
in footnote 9.
16.The nonstationarity of velocity may in part be attributable to
monetary policy induced volatility so that under a steady growth rate
rule velocity would no longer be nonstationary. However,
technological shocks and shifts in tastes that produce non—trend
stationary behavior of real output are generally assumed to be
invariant with respect to the money supply process. A constant growth
rate rule for the money supply with no base drift would, in this case,
still result in nonstationary price level behavior.
17.The test statistic is the F—statistic for the null hypothesis that
= = 0in the regression x -x1
=+ ix, where x is the
first difference of V. R, P and M. The 5% critical value,
interpolated from Oickey and Fuller [19811, is 5.1, and the values of
the test statistics were 7.9 for V. 1.6 for P, 12.7 for R, and 14.9
for M.
18.Stock and Watson [19871 find that the rate of inflation is stationary
around a time trend during the 1960 -1979period. However, for the
longer 1960 -1985period, they find that no trend is necessary to
induce stationarity in the rate of inflation.- 34-
19.Ii a previous version of this paper, only the results using the first
difference of the inflation rate were presented. While the papers
basic conclusions hold using either specification, I have used the
model that enters P in first difference form and includes a time trend
for two reasons. First, the structural model has a more easily
interpreted form when all variables are differenced in the same
degree. Second, the impulse response functions in the model using the
first difference of the rate of inflation often show permanent effects
of shocks on the rate of inflation even in the absence of any long—run
effect on the rate of money growth. Such seemingly implausible
results did not arise when the first difference of the price level and
a time trend were used.
20.Because of the shortness of the sample, a longer lag length was not
tried. A lag length of three was rejected when tested against a lag
length of four (2(25)45.7, marginal significance level =0.007).
21.For a discussion of the problems in drawing structural conclusions
from VARs, see Cooley and LeRoy [1985].
22.For a discussion of these estimators, see Hanson and Singleton [19821
or Chamberlain [19831.
23.See Bernanke [19861. If b' is the lxS vector of estimated
coefficients on in the VAR equation for APt then b'vt gives the
revision in the expectation of Pt÷i due to the observation of Vt.
24.Note that (3) is consistent with either a Lucas—type supply curve or
with the type of aggregate supply curve implied by the presence of
overlapping wage contracts as in Fischer [1977] and Taylor [1979],
since Pt jS equal to a one step ahead forecast error.- 35-
25.By way of comparison, the matrix used to orthogonalize the residuals
using a Choleski decomposition with ordering ,y, p. r, in, t—m is equal
to
0.0215 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0040 0.0030 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0037 0.0043 0.0063 0.0 0.0
0.0078 0.0051 -0.0025 0.00540.0
0.0011-0.0033-0.0004 —0.00 0.0042
26.The coeffiient
a6Isthe one most likely to have shifted over the
sampleperiod-in response to changes in Fed operating procedures.
Consequently, the estimated value may not adequately reflect the true
response during any particular policy regime. Barro [1987] finds
evidence that the stochastic process followed by the fionetary base in
the U.S. during the postwar period is consistent with interest rate
smoothing behavior by the Fed.
-
27.To be comparable with Table 4, this has been multiplied by 1000.
28.In Walsh [1986], it is noted that base drift is positively correlated
with the subsequent midpoint of the growth rate range the FOMC sets
for Ml. That is, positive target overshoots tended to be followed by
upward revisions in the target growth rate range.- 36-
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Tests for Cointegration: 1976:1 —1984:4
I.Cointegrating Vector: (1 —1)'.
X.f -xti




M-P T-P T-M 5%CriticalValue
Test Statistic: 0.44 0.36 5•97* 5.1
II. Unknown Cointegrating Vector: (1 —a)'
A.Cointegrating Regression Xt =a0+ 't +
c.
Variable Pair
M and P 1 and P1 and M 5%CriticalValue
1.01 1.01 1.00
Test Statistic (DW): 0.13 0.20 1.07* 0.39
— ct_i=ut_i+ ?1iti —ctji)
Residuals from
Cointegrating Regression
Test Statistic M and P1 and P 1 and M 5%CriticalValue
2 (q=0) 0.29 0.51 3.52* 3.37
F3 (q=4) 1.84 0.90 2.33 3.17
* Significant at the 5 percent level.Table 2
Tests for Cointegration between (M—P) and V


















_____ p m_ t—m
y 0.462 0.086 0.079 0.167 -0.024








_____ r_ p _____ t-rfl
y 1.00 0.80 0.43 0.70 -0.20







Entries multiplied by 1000.Table 4
Prameter Estimates for the Structural Model














= 0.0219 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0034 0.0075 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0040 0.0013 0.0024 -0.0006 -0.0000
0.0085 0.0004 0.0071 0.0030 -0.0000
-0.0008 -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0007
* Asymptotict—statistic greater than 1.96.
**TImes1000.Table 5
Variance Decomposition


















































































































Analternative specifications of the VAR system was estimated based on
the potential presence of a second unit root in the price level.
denotes the rate of inflation from t-1 to t, the alternative specification
included the first differences of V,r, R, M and the level of I -M.A
constant and the dumy for 1979:4 —1982:3were included In each equation,
but a time trend was not included.
Letting (y, ,r,m, t-m) denote the residuals from the VAR system,






= + c14(mt— + u3t
m =5y+a6rt+a7lrt+
U4t
tt_m = + + amt+
Inthe definition of the expected real interest rate, denotes
the effect of the current realization of on expectations of In
addition, equation (14) requires some explanation. Suppose the demand for






arRt.In order to express this in terms of the variables- A-2-
















Note that because money demand is a demand for real money
balances, restrictions are placed on the coefficients of the lagged first
differences of Y, R, and M. These restrictions on the lag were ignored in
the VAR estimation.
Parameter estimates are given In Table A.1, and the variance
decompositions are reported in Table A.2.
The Impulse response functions tend to imply conclusions similar to
those reported In the text with one important exception that is best
illustrated by Figure A.1. This figure shows the impact on the level of V
and H and the rate of Inflation of an aggregate supply shocks. The effect
onis similar to that implies by Figure 5a; inflation shocks leave the
rate of inflation permanently above the no—shock path. However, Figure A.1
shows no long—run Increase in the rate of money growth. Only the level of
H appears to be left higher. Similar results were found in response to
money demand and supply shocks. In each case, the specification using the
first difference of the inflation rate implied the somewhat implausible
result that permanent increases In the inflation rate were not accompanied
by any changes in the growth rate of money.Table A.1
Parameter Estimates for the Structural Model
Estimated Variances of Structural Disturbances**
a1
=. a= 0.0





















= 0.0267 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0040 0.0086 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0025 0.0015 0.0036 -0.0003 0.0001
0.0028 -0.0010 0.0113 0.0020 -0.0008
0.0036 0.0015 -0.0032 —0.0006 0.0041Table A.2
Variance Decomposition
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